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ARTICLE
SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE ACCORDING
TO THE LAWS OF NATURE AND OF NATURE'S GOD AND
THE ORIGINAL SECOND AMENDMENT
Matthew ]. Clark'
I. INTRODUCTION
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."'
Justice Joseph Story once called this right "the palladium of the liberties of a
republic."2 But from 1791 until 2008, the Supreme Court of the United
States said very little about this very important right. In 2008 and 2010,
however, the Court decided two cases that set the cornerstone for a Second
Amendment jurisprudence that will develop in the near future. In District of
Columbia v. Heller, the Court held that the Second Amendment protected
an individual right to keep and bear arms instead of a collective right that
depended on the government organizing a militia.' Two years later, in
McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court incorporated the Second
Amendment against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.' Thus, any
state or federal law that infringes on the Second Amendment will now be
considered void in a court of law.
However, Heller and McDonald addressed only one application of the
Second Amendment, which was the right to keep a handgun in one's
t Law Clerk to Chief Justice Roy S. Moore of the Supreme Court of Alabama; J.D.,
Liberty University School of Law, 2012; B.S., Liberty University, 2009. The author would like
to thank Professor Shawn Akers for inspiring this article, Mr. Benjamin DuPr6, Miss Aubrey
Blankenship, and Reverend Benjamin Knotts for their feedback, and the members of the
Liberty University Law Review-especially Ms. Melanie Migliaccio-for their help. Finally, I
would like to thank my Advocate the Lord Jesus Christ, because when I stood guilty before
the Judge that our Declaration of Independence calls the "Supreme Judge of the World," He
took my place and accepted the punishment that I deserved so that I could be acquitted
along with all who believe. @ 2014 Matthew J. Clark; LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW.
1.U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1890
(1833).
3. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
4. Id. at 595.
5. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010); see Heller, 554 U.S. at
570.
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home.6 The Court has yet to address other issues that it certainly will
confront, such as whether the Second Amendment protects the right to
carry a handgun in public, whether a person may possess a shotgun, a non-
military grade rifle, or even an assault weapon, and so forth. In order to
understand how the Second Amendment applies to these issues, one must
understand both the text of the Second Amendment and the intent of the
men who wrote it and the people who ratified it.' The Heller Court said that
the Second Amendment "was widely understood to codify a pre-existing
right, rather than to fashion a new one."' The founding fathers did believe
in pre-existing rights; they called them "unalienable Rights," which were
rights that were given to men by God.9 Therefore, it is necessary to
understand not only the history preceding and surrounding the ratification
of the Second Amendment, but also the laws of God that pertain to the
rights that the Second Amendment was intended to secure.
Part II develops a Second Amendment jurisprudence according to the
Second Amendment itself and the laws of the Creator that the Second
Amendment presupposes. Part II begins with the "Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God.""o Part II then examines the Second Amendment itself, Heller
and McDonald, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies the Second
Amendment to the states. Based on those principles, Part II concludes by
proposing two tests to assist with a Second Amendment analysis: the object
test and the infantryman test. Then, Part III applies Part II's jurisprudence
to issues that will arise soon under the Second Amendment, in hope of
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. Chief Justice Marshall stated this same rule in an early constitutional case as follows:
As men, whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words
which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the
enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted
it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to
have intended what they have said. If, from the imperfection of human
language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given
power, it is a well settled rule, that the objects for which it was given, especially
when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great
influence in the construction... .We know of no rule for construing the extent
of such powers, other than is given by the language of the instrument which
confers them, taken in connexion with the purposes for which they were
conferred.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188-89 (1824).
8. Heller, 554 U.S. at 603.
9. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
10. Id. para. 1.
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offering assistance to those who will wrestle with these issues in the near
future.
II: THE LAWS OF NATURE AND OF NATURE'S GOD AND THE
LAW OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A. The Laws of Nature and of Nature's God
1. On the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God Generally
"In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth."" When God
made man in His image, He gave man dominion over "the fish of the sea
and over the birds of the sky and over the cattle and over all the earth, and
over every creeping thing that creeps on the earth." 2 But despite the fact
that He gave man dominion over "all the earth," He still gave man
commands as to how man should exercise his dominion," thus showing
that He still had the authority to govern the world as He pleased. As God
said later, " [A]ll the earth is Mine."" Because all of creation belongs to God,
man has no authority at all unless that authority is given by God.
This concept is well-recognized in our legal heritage. Sir William
Blackstone, who was the second-most quoted thinker during the founding
era,'5 explained the concept this way: "[W]hen the Supreme Being formed
the universe, and created matter out of nothing, he impressed certain
principles upon that matter, from which it can never depart, and without
which it would cease to be."'6 And just like the rest of creation, man,
"considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws of his
Creator."" Because "man depends absolutely upon his Maker for
everything," Blackstone argued, "it is necessary that [man] should, in all
points conform to his Maker's will. This will of his Maker is called the law
11. Genesis 1:1. All Bible quotations in this article are from the New American Standard
Bible unless otherwise indicated.
12. Genesis 1:26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. See, e.g., Genesis 1:28 (commanding man to be "fruitful and multiply" and "subdue
[the earth]"); Genesis 2:16-17 (forbidding man to eat from the tree of knowledge of good and
evil).
14. Exodus 19:4-6.
15. DONALD LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 142-43 (1988).
16. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *38.
17. Id. at *39.
2014]1 717
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
of nature."" "This law of nature," Blackstone wrote, "being coeval with
mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to
any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times:
no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this[.]""
Blackstone said that God gave man the faculty of reason to discover the
law of nature,20 but that, because of original sin, man's reason is now "full of
ignorance and error."2' However, Blackstone continued:
This has given manifold occasion for the benign interposition of
Divine Providence; which, in compassion to the frailty, the
imperfection, and the blindness of human reason, hath been
pleased, at sundry times and in divers manners, to discover and
enforce its laws by an immediate and direct revelation. The
doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and
they are to be found only in the Holy Scriptures. These precepts,
when revealed, are found upon comparison to be really a part of
the original law of nature .... As then the moral precepts of this
law are indeed of the same origin with those of the law of nature,
so their intrinsic obligation is of equal strength and perpetuity.
Yet undoubtedly the revealed law is of infinitely more
authenticity than that moral system which is framed by ethical
writers, and denominated the natural law; because one is the law
of nature, expressly declared so to be by God himself; the other is
only what, by the assistance of human reason, we imagine to be
that law. If we could be as certain of the latter as we are of the
former, both would have an equal authority; but, till then, they
can never be put in any competition together. 22
Blackstone concluded his discussion of the issue by saying, "Upon these two
foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human
laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these."23
Blackstone's definition of the law of nature-the will of the Creator-
was shared by other influential English writers and is reflected in the
Declaration of Independence. Sir Edward Coke defined the law of nature as
18. Id.
19. Id. at *41.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at *41-42 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at *42.
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"that which God at the time of creation of the nature of man infused into
his heart, for his preservation and direction," and was also the same law
given to Moses as recorded in the Scriptures.24 Likewise, John Locke wrote,
"Human Laws are measures in respect of Men whose Actions
they must direct, albeit such measures they are as have also their
higher Rules to be measured by, which Rules are two, the Law of
God, and the Law of Nature; so that Laws Human must be made
according to the general Laws of Nature, and without
contradiction to any positive Law of Scripture, otherwise they are
ill made.""
Since the founding fathers drew heavily on this tradition, there is no reason
to think that there was any difference between the law of nature as
described by Coke, Locke, and Blackstone and the phrase "the Laws of
Nature and of Nature's God"2 6 in the Declaration of Independence.27 Thus,
the Anglo-American legal and political heritage reflects this truth: all
human authority is given by God, but any human law that runs afoul of His
law is not law at all. Throughout this Article, the terms "law of nature" and
"Laws of Nature and of Nature's God" will be used interchangeably to refer
to this concept.
Having established that all authority comes from God and that God gave
man authority over creation, the next question is whether God gave man
authority over man for the purpose of establishing human governments and
human laws. In Genesis 9, God made a covenant with Noah and his sons
(who populated the entire world), saying, "And from every man, from every
man's brother I will require the life of man. Whoever sheds man's blood, By
man his blood shall be shed, For in the image of God He made man."" This
may be viewed as a mandate for human government, because it is the first
24. Calvin v. Smith, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 379, 391-92 (K.B.); 7 Co. Rep. 2 a, 12 b. Coke
"was a predecessor of Blackstone[ and served as] Attorney General, Chief Justice of the
Court of Common Pleas, and Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench[.]" JOHN EIDSMOE,
CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 69 (1987).
25. EIDSMOE, supra note 24, at 62 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, BOOK II,
ch. II § 136 n. (1689)). Locke was the third-most cited thinker by the founding generation.
LUTZ, supra note 15, at 142-43.
26. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
27. Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Marbury v. Madison and the Foundation of Law, 4 LIBERTY U. L.
REV. 297, 300 n.13 (2010).
28. Genesis 9:5-6. God made this covenant after the worldwide flood described in
Genesis 6-9.
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time that God gave man authority over man for the purpose of punishing
evil.29 This commission was given to man before any institutional
governments were ever established.o
The Bible tells us in the New Testament passages of Romans 13 and I
Peter 2 that human governments are established by God for the purposes of
punishing evil and praising good.3 Those New Testament passages comport
with the commission in Genesis 9. Thus, it appears that God's intention for
government was to give governmental authority directly to man first and
then to the institutional government.3 2 Although institutional governments
are also directly accountable to God,33 authority flows from God to the
people to the government. Therefore, the government has only the
governmental authority given to it by the people, and the people have only
the governmental authority given to them by God.
2. On the Issue of Gun Control
The next question, then, is whether the government has authority to
prohibit the keeping and bearing of arms. The Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God give the government the authority to punish "evil."" The root
word for "evil" in Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2 is the word "kakos" in the
29. See EIDSMOE, supra note 24, at 61 ("[Locke] based the social compact which
government is established upon 'that Paction which God made with Noah after the
Deluge."').
30. Locke called this status of being under the law of nature without a formal
government the "state of nature," and argued that "the execution of the law of nature is, in
that state, put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the
transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation." LOCKE, supra note 25,
at ch. II § 7.
31. See Romans 13:1-7; 1 Peter 2:13-14.
32. Accord 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *7-8 ("It is clear, that the right of
punishing crimes against the law of nature, as murder and the like, in a state of mere nature
vested in every individual.... In a state of society this right is transferred from individuals to
the sovereign power; whereby men are prevented from being judges in their own causes,
which is one of the evils that civil government was intended to remedy. Whatever power
therefore individuals had of punishing offences against the law of nature, that is now vested
in the magistrate alone, who bears the sword of justice by the consent of the whole
community.").
33. See Romans 13:1, 6 ("[Tlhose [governments] which exist are established by God....
[R]ulers are servants of God").
34. Romans 13:1-7 (using the Greek verb kakos, translated "evil"); I Peter 2:13-14
(using the related term kakospoyos, translated "evil doer").
720 [Vol. 8:715
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original Greek." "'The use of kakos may be broadly divided as follows: (a) of
what is morally or ethically evil, whether of persons or deeds; (b) of what is
injurious, destructive, baneful, [or] pernicious[.]'" 6 Thus, there are two
types of evil, both of which God has given government the authority to
punish: (1) "an act which is innately evil, whether it causes harm to another
or not,"3 7 and (2) an act that "interferes with another's carrying out his
duties to God."38 The question, then, is whether the keeping and bearing of
arms is "evil" in either sense of the word.
In considering whether the possession or carrying of weapons is
inherently evil-the first type of kakos-one should consider whether the
Scriptures forbid the possession or carrying of weapons. First, the Bible
never says that merely possessing or carrying weapons is wrong.39
Moreover, Jesus on one occasion commanded His disciples to buy swords,40
apparently for self-defense." Furthermore, Dr. Wayne Grudem4 2 observes
that when Peter drew his sword to defend Jesus in the Garden of
Gethsemane, Jesus never told Peter to throw his sword away but merely to
put it back in its place, because it was not right to fight under those
circumstances.43 Because God never forbade keeping or carrying arms (but
rather commanded it at times), the mere keeping or bearing arms is not
inherently evil; therefore, the government may not proscribe the keeping
and bearing of arms on that ground.
35. Roger Bern, A Biblical Model for Analysis of Issues of Law and Public Policy: With
Illustrative Applications to Contracts, Antitrust, Remedies and Public Policy Issues, 6 Regent
U. L. Rev. 103, 124 n.108 (1995).
36. Id. at 124 (alteration in orginal omitted) (quoting W.E. VINE, THE EXPANDED VINE'S
EXPOSITORY DICTIONARY OF NEW TESTAMENT WORDs 380 (John R. Kohlenberger III ed.,
1984)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. For an excellent discussion on the Biblical view of weapons and self defense, see
WAYNE GRUDEM, POLITICS ACCORDING TO THE BIBLE 201-212 (2010).
40. Luke 22:36-38.
41. GRUDEM, supra note 39, at 203.
42. "Wayne Grudem is Research Professor of Theology and Biblical Studies at Phoenix
Seminary in Phoenix, AZ. He holds degrees from Harvard (BA), Westminster Seminary
(MDiv), and Cambridge (PhD). He is the author of over fifteen books including the
bestselling Systematic Theology." Id. at back cover.
43. Id. at 203.
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However, the second type of kakos refers to acts that are "injurious,
destructive, baneful, [or] pernicious""-acts that, while perhaps not
inherently evil, have the effect of "interfer[ing] with another's carrying out
his duties to God."4 ' Depending on the circumstances, keeping or bearing
arms may fall within this category of evil. For instance, if a person is
walking down Main Street with a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, the
exceptionally dangerous character of this weapon would cause many
people to be injured if it accidentally discharged. Even if it did not
accidentally discharge, the exceptionally dangerous character of this
weapon and weapons like it could cause people to stay home in fear rather
than going out and engaging in commerce and working, which are duties
to God.46 Thus, depending on the circumstances, governments may be
authorized to regulate the keeping and bearing of arms under the second
type of kakos.
However, any such regulation of keeping or bearing arms must not run
afoul of the right of self-defense. Passages from both the Old and New
Testaments support the notion that individuals have the right to use force,
including weapons, in self-defense. In the Old Testament, the strongest
support for this proposition is found in Exodus 22:2-4, which says:
If the thief is caught while breaking in and is struck so that he
dies, there will be no bloodguiltiness on his account. But if the
sun has risen on him, there will be bloodguiltiness on his
account. He shall surely make restitution; if he owns nothing,
then he shall be sold for his theft. If what he stole is actually
found alive in his possession, whether an ox or a donkey or a
sheep, he shall pay double."
In this passage, God explicitly says that if one strikes and kills a thief while
he is breaking in, then the one who struck him is not guilty of murder. The
44. Bern, supra note 35, at 124 n.108.
45. Id.
46. See Genesis 1:28 (establishing a duty to "Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth,
and subdue it; and rule over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the sky and over every
living thing that moves on the earth"); Exodus 20:9 (establishing a duty to "labor and do all
[one's] work"); 2 Thessalonians 3:10 (establishing the principle that "if anyone is not willing
to work, then he is not to eat, either"); see also 4 WILuIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *149
("The offence of riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime
against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the land[.]").
47. Exodus 22:2.
722 [Vol. 8:715
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next verse says there is guilt "if the sun has risen on him.""8 The passage
concludes by saying that the thief is required to make restitution.9
Because God explicitly says that the one who struck the thief while
catching him in the act shall not be guilty of murder, this passage recognizes
a right to use lethal force; the only remaining question is the scope of that
right. In context, there are two possible interpretations of this passage: first,
one who kills a thief breaking and entering at night is not guilty of murder,
but one who kills a thief in the daylight is guilty of murder; 0 second, one
who kills the thief while catching him in the act is not guilty of murder, but
one who kills the thief after the act is guilty of murder." The passage
continues by saying that the default remedy for theft is restitution. If the
thief has already stolen property and absconded, then there would be no
need to hurt him but only to make him restore what he stole; but if one
encounters the thief in the act, then there would be the possibility that the
thief would harm the one who caught him. Although there is no need to use
self-defense after a thief has already absconded with the owner's property,
there may be the need to use self-defense when catching the thief in the
act. 3 Moreover, the text itself does not qualify the immunity for killing the
thief by saying it must be "at night."" Consequently, the phrase "if the sun
has risen on him" appears to be a figure of speech meaning "after the
event."" The context suggests that the second interpretation is correct.
In summary, Exodus 22:2-4 appears to stand for the proposition that one
has the right to self-defense when catching a thief in the act of breaking and
entering, but not after the event has occurred. Blackstone had a remarkably
similar rule regarding the right of self-defense:
48. Exodus 22:3a.
49. Exodus 22:3b-4.
50. ZONDERVAN NASB STUDY BIBLE 108 (Kenneth Barker et al. eds., 1999).
51. NELSON'S NKJV STUDY BIBLE 139 (Earl D. Radmacher, Th.D. et al. eds., 1997).
52. Exodus 22:3b-4.
53. Cf LocKE, supra note 25, at ch. III § 18 ("This makes it lawful for a man to kill a
thief who has not in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther
than by the use of force, so to get him in his power as to take away his money, or what he
pleases, from him; because using force, where he has no right, to get me into his power, let
his pretence be what it will, I have no reason to suppose that he who would take away my
liberty would not, when he had me in his power, take away every thing else.").
54. Some translations insert the words "at night" into verse 2, but most translations do
not include it. Compare Exodus 22:2-4 (CEV, GNT, NCV) with Exodus 22:2-4 (ASV, ESV,
KJV, NASB, NET, NKJV, NLT).
55. See ZONDERVAN NASB STUDY BIBLE, supra note 50, at 108.
2014] 723
LIBERTY UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW
[I]f the party himself, or any of these his relations [such as one's
spouse, child, employee, or anyone to whom one bears a near
connection], be forcibly attacked in his person or property, it is
lawful for him to repel force by force, and the breach of the
peace, which happens, is chargeable upon him only who began
the affray.... Self-defence therefore, as it is justly called the
primary law of nature, so it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken
away by the law of society. In the English law particularly it is
held an excuse for breaches of the peace, nay even for homicide
itself: but care must be taken, that the resistance does not exceed
the bounds of mere defence and prevention; for then the
defender would himself become an aggressor."
Blackstone's view of self-defense aligns well with the interpretation of
Exodus 22:2-4 expounded above. But even if Exodus 22:2-4 stands for the
narrower proposition that one has the right to use self-defense while
encountering the thief breaking and entering at night, the fact stands that
God explicitly says that the one who kills the thief under those
circumstances is not guilty of murder. In either case, Exodus 22:2-4
recognizes the right to use force, even lethal force, in certain situations,
apparently for the purpose of self-defense.
Likewise, Jesus also appeared to recognize the right of force in self-
defense. In Luke 22:35-38, Jesus had the following discourse with His
disciples:
And He said to them, "When I sent you out without money belt
and bag and sandals, you did not lack anything, did you?" They
said, "No, nothing." And He said to them, "But now, whoever
has a money belt is to take it along, likewise also a bag, and
whoever has no sword is to sell his coat and buy one. For I tell
you that this which is written must be fulfilled in Me, 'And He
was numbered with transgressors'; for that which refers to Me
has its fulfillment." They said, "Lord, look, here are two swords."
And He said to them, "It is enough."57
56. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *3-4. Blackstone also reasoned that self-
defense was a suitable remedy when the victim needed to repel violence immediately, but if
the event had already passed, then the victim's proper remedy would be through the courts,
not in killing the initial aggressor. See id.; 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *184.
57. Luke 22:36.
[Vol. 8:715724
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In this passage, Jesus explicitly told His disciples to buy swords if they did
not have swords. In context, Jesus began this discussion by referring to a
time in His ministry where He sent the disciples out "without money belt
and bag and sandals," but the disciples nevertheless "did not lack
anything[.]"" Luke records that account earlier in his Gospel, in which
Jesus sent His disciples out without those things, making the disciples
dependent on the hospitality of others." The disciples did not lack anything
on that journey60 probably because the people receiving the disciples knew
that they were disciples of Jesus, who at the time was a popular public
figure.61
However, in the present passage, Jesus gave His disciples the exact
opposite instructions, and included the instruction to buy swords if they did
not have them. Dr. Grudem explains that "[p]eople commonly carried
swords at that time for protection against robbers."62 Moreover, Jesus'
command to buy swords and to carry provisions on future travels is
immediately followed by the phrase, "For I tell you that this which is written
must be fulfilled in Me, 'AND HE WAS NUMBERED WITH TRANSGRESSORS';
for that which refers to Me has its fulfillment."6 This statement appears to
be the reason for the change of instructions. In interpreting this statement,
Dr. Grudem says, "The fact that Jesus was going to be crucified meant an
increasing danger of people attacking the disciples as well.""
This appears to be the most reasonable interpretation in context. The
first time Jesus sent the disciples out, they were received gladly, because they
were associated with a popular figure.6 1 In contrast, in the future, the
disciples would not always be received gladly, because they would be
associated with the One whom many would consider a transgressor.66 As a
58. Luke 22:35.
59. Luke 9:1-5. See also NELSON's NKJV STUDY BIBLE 1745 (Earl D. Radmacher, Th.D. et
al. eds., 1997) (confirming that Jesus was alluding to Luke 9:1-5).
60. Luke 22:35.
61. See Matthew 4:23-25; Mark 1:28, 39, 45.
62. GRUDEM, supra note 39, at 202.
63. Luke 22:37 (quoting Isaiah 53:12).
64. GRUDEM, supra note 39, at 202.
65. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
66. See John 15:18-25 (Jesus telling the disciples that the world would hate them because
it would hate Jesus). See also NELSON'S NKJV STUDY BIBLE, supra note 5959, at 1745. Jesus, of
course, was no transgressor, but was willing to be treated as a transgressor and suffer a
transgressor's punishment so that man, who was the transgressor before God, could be
forgiven. In the same passage from Isaiah that Jesus quoted from in this discussion, it says,
2014] 725
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result, the disciples would now be more dependent on themselves than on
the good will of others because many would now wish them ill will rather
than good will. Consequently, the disciples now would have to provide for
themselves and protect themselves. It appears that the disciples
misinterpreted Jesus' command to mean that they were getting ready to
fight, which is why Jesus ended the discussion by saying, "It is enough."67
Nevertheless, both by the plain statement of Jesus' command and the
context in which He made it, the most reasonable interpretation of this
passage is that Jesus was telling His disciples to buy swords for their own
protection and to take the swords with them on their future journeys.8
Thus, Jesus not only permitted but also commanded His disciples to buy
swords, apparently for their own protection, confirming that they had the
right to defend themselves."
But He was pierced through for our transgressions,
He was crushed for our iniquities;
The chastening for our well-being fell upon Him,
And by His scourging we are healed.
All of us like sheep have gone astray,
Each of us has turned to his own way;
But the LoRD caused the iniquity of us all
To fall on Him.
Isaiah 53:5-6.
67. See NELSON's NKJV STUDY BIBLE, supra note 59, at 1745, 1746 (arguing that the
disciples misunderstood Jesus' instructions, as demonstrated by the fighting in the Garden of
Gethsemane that risked giving the impression that Jesus' disciples were seditious).
68. GRUDEM, supra note 39, at 202; see also NELSON's NKJV STUDY BIBLE, supra note 59,
at 1745.
69. One may object that this interpretation is inconsistent with Jesus' other teachings,
such as the command to turn the other cheek and Jesus' command to Peter to put his sword
away in the Garden of Gethsemane. In Matthew 5:38-39, Jesus said, "You have heard that it
was said, 'AN EYE FOR AN EYE AND A TOOTH FOR A TOOTH.' But I say to you, do not resist an evil
person; but whoever slaps you on your right cheek, turn the other to him also." Dr. Grudem
explains,
Jesus is not prohibiting self-defense here. He is prohibiting individuals from
taking personal vengeance simply to "get even" with another person. The verb
"slaps" is the Greek term rhapiza, which refers to a sharp slap given in insult (a
right-handed person would use the back of the hand to slap someone "on the
right cheek"). So the point is not to hit back when someone hits you as an
insult. But the idea of a violent attack to do bodily harm or even murder
someone is not in view here.
GRUDEM, supra note 39, at 202 (footnote omitted). Moreover, the focus of this passage is on
non-retaliation. See ZONDERVAN NASB STUDY BIBLE, supra note 50, at 1585. Non-retaliation
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Based on the Old and New Testament passages addressed above, the
conclusion is that the Bible recognizes an individual right to self-defense.
The reason is simple: God gives individuals life and forbids the wrongful
taking of life.7 ' Therefore, the right to life gives rise to the right of
individuals to protect their right to life in self-defense. As Blackstone said,
"Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every
individual .... Both the life and the limbs of a man are of such high value
... that it pardons even homicide if committed se defendendo, or in order to
preserve them."7' Because God gave man the right to live, and because the
right to life gives rise to the right to self-defense, governmental regulation of
firearms may not infringe upon the right of self-defense.
B. Constitutional Principles
After examining what the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God demand,
one must take the analysis one step further. The scope of what governments
may do may be further limited by the Constitution and laws made pursuant
to the Constitution. Therefore, after examining the Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God, one must examine the Constitution as well. As long as the
Federal Constitution does not violate the Laws of Nature and of Nature's
means not seeking to repay someone else for a wrong that has already been done; self-defense,
in contrast, means protecting one's self from a wrong that is about to occur.
Similarly, in the Garden of Gethsemane, Jesus told one of His disciples to put his
sword away when he wanted to fight to protect Jesus. Jesus said,
Put your sword back in its place; for all those who take up the sword shall
perish by the sword. Or do you not think I can appeal to My Father, and He
will at once put at My disposal more than twelve legions of angels? How then
will the Scriptures be fulfilled, which say that it must happen this way?
Matthew 26:52-54. Several verses later, Jesus, referring to His arrest, said, "But all this has
taken place to fulfill the Scriptures of the prophets." Matthew 26:56. In this passage, it
appears that Jesus told His disciple to put his sword back in its place because the Scriptures,
which say "that it must happen this way," had to be fulfilled. Matthew 26:54. Consequently,
any of Jesus' disciples' attempts to save Him that night or fight the authorities for His
kingdom would end in death, hence His words, "all those who take up the sword shall perish
by the sword." GRUDEM, supra note 39, at 194-95; see also John 18:36 (Jesus telling Pilate that
Jesus' disciples would not fight for Him or for His kingdom because His kingdom was not of
this world). Moreover, Jesus never told the disciple to throw his sword away, but merely to
put it back in its place, meaning that "[ilt was apparently right for Peter to continue carrying
his sword, just not to use it to prevent Jesus' arrest and crucifixion." GRUDEM, supra note 39,
at 194-95. Thus, Jesus' command in this passage did not abrogate His command to buy
swords in Luke 22:36.
70. Exodus 20:13 ("You shall not murder.").
71. Accord 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130.
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God, the Constitution trumps federal or state laws whenever they conflict
with it.72 The Second Amendment of the Constitution says, "A well-
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."73
The Supreme Court gave the Second Amendment its first in-depth
interpretation in District of Columbia v. Heller." In Heller, the District of
Columbia (controlled by the federal government, not the states) had
generally prohibited the possession of handguns." The District could make
exceptions, but, even then, firearms were to be kept "unloaded and
disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device." 76 In considering
whether the District violated the Second Amendment, the Court divided the
Second Amendment into two parts: the prefatory clause and the operative
clause.77 The Court held that the prefatory clause-"A well-regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State"-announced a
purpose, which included repelling invasions, suppressing insurrections,
discouraging standing armies, and resisting tyranny, but did not limit the
operative clause.7 s The operative clause-"the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"-connoted an individual right to
keep and bear arms.7 ' The Court interpreted the phrase "keep and bear
Arms" to mean "the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of
confrontation."80 The Court further explained that the prefatory clause was
added to appease Anti-federalist fears that the new federal government
would disarm the people, but that it fit perfectly with the operative clause
and did not change the scope of the operative clause.81
Applying these principles, the Court held that the District's ban on
handguns violated the Second Amendment.82 Furthermore, the Court held
72. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land... any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
73. U.S. CONsT. amend. II.
74. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
75. Id. at 574.
76. Id. at 575 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id. at 577.
78. Id. at 597-98.
79. Id. at 592.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 595-603.
82. Id. at 635.
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that the District's requirement that legally owned guns be disassembled or
locked also violated the Second Amendment." The Court made clear,
though, that the right to keep and bear arms was not absolute. The states
could still enforce longstanding prohibitions like the prohibition of carrying
concealed arms," prohibition of firearms by felons or the mentally ill,"
prohibition of carrying firearms in sensitive places like "schools and
government buildings,"86 conditions on the commercial sale of arms," and
the prohibition of carrying dangerous or unusual weapons."
Heller comports well with the law-of-nature analysis and with the text of
the Constitution itself, with one exception: Heller allows governments to
regulate, or even ban, "weapons that are most useful in military service.""
Justice Scalia, quoting United States v. Miller," wrote that "the sorts of
weapons protected were those 'in common use at the time,'' which, by
today's standards, would not include "M-16 rifles and the like."92 Justice
Scalia, citing Blackstone and others, argued that this limitation "is fairly
supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of
'dangerous and unusual weapons.""' However, Blackstone never argued
that possessing dangerous or unusual weapons was a crime, but only that
"riding or going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons" was a crime."
The rationale for this rule was that carrying dangerous or unusual weapons
was "a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the
land."" Thus, Justice Scalia failed to recognize the common-law difference
between possessing military-grade weapons and carrying military-grade
weapons. Furthermore, Justice Scalia failed to account for the possibility
that the reason M-16s and the like were not in common usage in 2008 was
83. Id.
84. Id. at 626.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 627.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 627-28.
90. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
91. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *149.
95. Id.
-2014] 729
LIBERTY UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW
that federal law heavily restricted such weapons for a long time.96 Under
Heller's logic, because the Second Amendment protects only weapons in
common usage, the government can take whatever weapons it wants out of
common usage if it finds the weapons to be dangerous or unusual.
Moreover, Justice Scalia's analysis misses the bigger point: the framers of
the Second Amendment intended for the Second Amendment to allow the
people to form an effective militia. Responding to the claims that the federal
government would use a standing army to oppress the people, James
Madison, one of the framers of the Second Amendment,97 wrote in
Federalist 46,
The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the
State governments is the visionary supposition that the federal
government may previously accumulate a military force for the
projects of ambition ..... Extravagant as the supposition is, let it,
however, be made. Let a regular army fully equal to the resources
of the country be formed, and let it be entirely at the devotion of
the federal government; still it would not be going too far to say
that the State governments, with the people on their side, would
be able to repel the danger. The highest number to which,
according to the best computation, a standing army can be
carried in any country, does not exceed one hundredth part of
the whole number of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the
number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield, in
the United States, an army of more than twenty-five or thirty
thousand men. To these would be opposed a militia amounting
to near half a million of citizens with arms in their hands,
officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for
their common liberties, and united and conducted by
governments possessing their affections and confidence. It may
well be doubted whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever
be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops. Those who
are best acquainted with the last successful resistance of this
country against the British arms, will be most inclined to deny
the possibility of it. Besides the advantage of being armed, which
the Americans possess over the people of almost every other
nation, the existence of subordinate governments to which the
96. See Fully-Automatic Firearms, NRA-ILA, http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/fact-
sheets/1999/fully-automatic-firearms.aspx (July 29, 1999).
97. DAVID BARTON, THE SECOND AMENDMENT 27(2005).
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people are attached, and by which the militia officers are
appointed, forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition
more insurmountable than any which a simple government of
any form can admit of.98
Likewise, George Mason, the "Father of the Bill of Rights,"" noted that
disarming the people "was the best and most effectual way to enslave
them."'00 Richard Henry Lee, a framer of the Second Amendment in the
First Congress, said, "[T]o preserve liberty, it is essential that the whole
body of the people always possess arms, and be taught alike, especially when
young, how to use them."0 ' Theodore Sedwick, another framer of the
Second Amendment in the First Congress, also said, "It [is] a chimerical
idea to suppose that a country like this could ever be enslaved. How is an
army for that purpose to [] subdue a nation of freemen who know how to
prize liberty and who have arms in their hands?" 02 In his Commentaries on
the Constitution, Justice Story observed that the militia was "the natural
defence of a free country against sudden foreign invasions, domestic
insurrections, and domestic usurpations of power by rulers."'03
Justice Scalia's analysis misses the broader point that the prefatory clause
did not merely announce the problem that the framers were trying to solve
at the time, but rather was intended to expand the scope of the Second
Amendment's protection beyond the core right of self-defense. Part of that
intention was to protect the right of the people to form an effective militia
that was ready to fight an army, whether a foreign army or a tyrannical
American army. It is inconceivable that such a militia could fight effectively
today without military-grade weapons, which is a point that the Heller
Court itself conceded."0 Thus, Heller contains a critical error regarding the
regulation of military weapons.
Heller was a very important case in Second Amendment jurisprudence.
However, because the issue in Heller came from the District of Columbia,
which was controlled by the federal government (which was limited by the
98. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 at 316-17 (James Madison) (Paul Leicester Ford ed. 1898).
99. BARTON, supra note 97, at 27.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 28-29.
103. STORY, surpa note 2 at § 1890.
104. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).
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Bill of Rights), the issue of whether the states were bound by the Second
Amendment remained open.
Originally, the Bill of Rights bound only the federal government. 0 After
the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment placed new limits on the states.
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids any state from "mak[ing] or
enforc[ing] any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States" or "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."'06 Section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment gives Congress the authority to enforce the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' Congress has passed a law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
that allows anyone whose Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated
to sue in federal court.' Through this avenue, many of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights had been "incorporated" against the states.o' Until 2010,
the question of whether the Second Amendment should be incorporated
against the states remained unresolved.
In 2010, the Supreme Court held in McDonald v. City of Chicago that the
Second Amendment was "fully applicable to the states" through the
Fourteenth Amendment."10 Like the situation in Heller, the city of Chicago
had banned handguns in the city."' Walking through an incorporation
analysis, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the
Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.'12 Thus, the Court struck
down the city's ban on hand guns.' 13 Justice Thomas concurred in the
judgment but argued that the Second Amendment should be applied to the
states via the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather than the Due Process
Clause."'
105. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1883).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
108. Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
109. The author is a full incorporationist, believing that the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended to apply all the protections of individual rights in the Bill of Rights
against the states through the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See generally Martin
Wishnatsky, Taming the Supreme Court, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REv. 597, 611-20 (2012) (discussing
the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment).
110. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).
111. Id.
112. Id.at 3050.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 3058-88 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The
author believes Justice Thomas was right.
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In sum, the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God, the Second
Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment forbid the government from
abridging the right to keep and bear arms. The Supreme Court has not yet
discussed the full scope of the right to keep and bear arms. What the Court
has said is that the government may not fully ban handguns, especially in
the home."' Heller held that the government may limit (1) the concealed
carry of weapons, (2) the issuing firearms to felons and those who are
mentally ill, (3) the carrying of firearms in sensitive places like schools or
government buildings, (4) the commercial sale of firearms through
conditions, and (5) the carrying of unusual or dangerous weapons."'
Finally, although the Heller Court failed to recognize this principle, the
government may not limit the right to keep and bear arms so much that it
hinders the right of the people to form an effective militia.
C. The Object and Infantryman Tests-Possible Guides to Future Issues
Arising Under the Second Amendment
Heller and McDonald provided greatly needed clarification to what the
Second Amendment forbids governments from doing. Heller and
McDonald were mostly good decisions. Nevertheless, although Heller and
McDonald established the general principles that there is an individual right
to keep and bear arms and that the Second Amendment is "fully applicable"
to the states,117 the only particular application known for certain is that the
states may not adopt a complete prohibition of handguns, especially in the
home. To the extent that a test would be helpful in evaluating new issues
arising under the Second Amendment, so that the federal and state
governments may know "before they act the standard to which they will be
held, rather than be compelled to guess about the outcome of Supreme
Court peek-a-boo,""' two such tests would be useful: the object test and the
infantryman test.
1. The Object Test
Under the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God and the Second
Amendment, while states may not abrogate the right of self-defense, they
may legislate pursuant to their police powers, namely, the public health,
115. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at
3050.
116. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
117. McDonald, 130 S.Ct. at 3026.
118. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 574 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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safety, welfare, and morals."' Of those four traditional police powers, the
public safety would be implicated the most in gun control laws. Therefore,
the question should be whether the object of the gun control law implicates
the right of self-defense or the public safety. Legislation abrogating the
former should be held unconstitutional, but laws enacted pursuant to the
later should be legal.
In the early days of the republic, the object test was Chief Justice
Marshall's key to discerning the difference between federal power to
regulate interstate commerce and state police powers. In Gibbons v.
Ogden,20 the state of New York granted Gibbons a monopoly for navigating
the waters between New York City and New Jersey.' 2' Ogden sued, claiming
that the monopoly was void under a federal law that was made pursuant to
the Commerce Clause.'22 This meant that the Supreme Court would have to
construe the Commerce Clause for the first time. In interpreting the
Commerce Clause, Chief Justice Marshall said:
If, from the imperfection of the human language, there should be
serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a
well settled rule, that the objects for which it was given, especially
when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should
have great influence in the construction.... We know of no rule
for construing the extent of such powers, other than is given by
the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in
connexion with the purposes for which they were conferred.'23
At the time the Supreme Court decided Gibbons v. Ogden, the word
"object," as used in this context, meant "[t]hat to which the mind is directed
for accomplishment or attainment; end; ultimate purpose."' Accordingly,
Chief Justice Marshall recognized that the object of a constitutional
provision was the interpretational anchor that held the text in place.
119. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 344. The police powers to legislate pursuant to
the public safety, health, welfare, and morals aligns well with God's purpose for government
found in Genesis 9, Romans 13:1-7 and I Peter 2:13-14, discussed supra Part ILA.1.
120. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
121. Id. at 1-2.
122. Id. at 186.
123. Id. at 188-89.
124. NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828), available
at http://1828.mshaffer.com/d/word/object. This is the definition of the word for the
purposes of this article.
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Chief Justice Marshall went on to hold that the Commerce Clause gave
Congress the power to regulate intercourse among the several states.125 He
also said that the Commerce Clause placed the power to regulate commerce
among the states in the hands of Congress alone, 126 and that this power
included the power to regulate the navigation of waterways.127 In reviewing
Gibbons, Professor Jeffrey C. Tuomala reasons that the object of the
Commerce Clause, as Chief Justice Marshall understood it, was to promote
"the harmony of interstate commercial interests and probably the
protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce."128 Tuomala's
conclusion fits well with James Madison's, who said, "A very material object
of this power was the relief of the States, which import and export through
other States, from the improper contributions levied on them by the
latter." 29 Thus, Gibbons established that the federal government had
exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce. 30 However, that left a
significant problem for the states: Gibbons potentially meant that any action
a state took that even incidentally burdened interstate commerce could be
struck down under the Commerce Clause.'3'
Chief Justice Marshall solved this dilemma in Willson v. Black Bird Creek
Marsh Co. 32 In Willson, Delaware created a dam to contain a marsh that
was affecting the health and property value of the nearby inhabitants. 3
However, ships could no longer sail through that marsh because of the
dam.'3 ' The issue was whether the dam violated the Commerce Clause.' 3 In
considering the issue, Chief Justice Marshall said:
The value of the property on its banks must be enhanced by
excluding the water from the marsh, and the health of the
inhabitants probably improved. Measures calculated to produce
these objects, provided they do not come into collision with the
125. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189-90.
126. Id. at 193.
127. Id. at 196-97.
128. Jeffrey C. Tuomala, The Power to Regulate Interstate Commerce 4 (Fall 2009)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
129. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 at 275 (James Madison) (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1898).
130. Tuomala, supra note 128, at 4.
131. Id.
132. Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
133. Id. at 245-46, 251.
134. Id. at 245.
135. Id.
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powers of the general government, are undoubtedly within those
which are reserved to the states. But the measure authorised by
this act stops a navigable creek, and must be supposed to abridge
the rights of those who have been accustomed to use it. But this
abridgement, unless it comes in conflict with the constitution or
a law of the United States, is an affair between the government of
Delaware and its citizens, of which this Court can take no
cognizance.136
The Court went on to hold that because Congress had not passed an act that
conflicted with the Delaware law, there was no Dormant Commerce Clause
violation in this case. 37
In other words, the states could properly exercise "a police power [that]
might have an incidental adverse affect on interstate commerce," 38 but it
was permissible as long as the object of such legislation was within the state
police powers, not within the commerce power.139 Professor Tuomala
explains:
Only if Congress passed a law pursuant to its commerce powers
(e.g., prohibiting dams on navigable waterways) that conflicted
with the state's lawful exercise [of] its police powers would the
state law be struck down. It would not be a case of federal
commerce power trumping state commerce powers. It would be
a case of federal commerce power trumping the state exercise of
a police power that unnecessarily interfered with interstate
commerce. In effect, if the states in the lawful exercise of a police
power impose a burden on interstate commerce, it is for
Congress to determine whether the burden on interstate
commerce outweighs the benefit of the state's exercise of its
police powers.
In sum, Chief Justice Marshall used the object test to determine whether a
state could validly exercise a police power without violating the
Constitution. According to Chief Justice Marshall, if exercising the police
power incidentally burdened interstate commerce, it was fine unless
136. Id. at 251.
137. Id. at 252.
138. Tuomala, supra note 128, at 4.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 4-5.
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Congress decided that the burden was too great. In that case, Congress
would have the authority to trump the state law via the Supremacy Clause.
The same framework can apply to gun regulation. The Supreme Court
stated that the "core lawful purpose" of the Second Amendment was "self-
defense.""4' Furthermore, as Justice Scalia explained, the text of the Second
Amendment was meant to guarantee that individuals had the "right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation." 42 On the other hand, a
state may place certain restrictions on firearms by exercising its police
power of protecting the public safety. While a state may not abridge the
right of self-defense, it may place certain restrictions on which firearms may
be owned, where firearms may be carried, who may carry them, in what
manner they may be carried, and which weapons may be carried. Such
restrictions are valid as long as they do not abridge the right of self-defense.
Furthermore, just as Congress would have the authority to trump the state
police powers in the Commerce Clause cases if the state law incidentally
burdened interstate commerce, so Congress, pursuant to Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, would have the authority to trump a state's
exercise of its police power if it created an incidental burden on self-
defense.1"'
The distinction between self-defense and the public safety explains much
of the Court's reasoning in Heller. Because self-defense is the core of the
object of the Second Amendment, a complete prohibition on arms is
unconstitutional. When a person keeps a handgun in his home, he does so
to protect himself, not to go to war with society. Consequently, handguns in
the home implicate self-defense, not the public safety. Moreover, the
prohibition on carrying especially dangerous weapons implicates the public
safety, not self-defense, because self-defense can be accomplished through
the bearing of more conventional arms. Likewise, giving a firearm to a
mentally ill person or someone who is a convicted felon implicates the
public safety because such people carry a greater risk than most of harming
others (albeit unintentionally with the mentally ill) instead of merely
141. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3023 (2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
142. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
143. Thus, the only authority Congress has to regulate guns is the authority to protect the
right of the people to keep guns, not the authority to take guns away from the people. How
gross it is that Congress has turned the Constitution upside-down by ignoring its
Fourteenth-Amendment duties while misusing the Commerce Clause to do the very thing
the Constitution forbids. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) (restricting the right to keep and
bear arms for certain persons).
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defending themselves. The prohibition of concealed firearms may implicate
the public safety because it prevents ambushes. Furthermore, the
prohibition of firearms in sensitive areas implicates the public safety
because people would be more susceptible to harm in those places. Thus,
Heller's rules fit well with the distinction between the objects of self-defense
and the public safety. Therefore, just as the Marshall Court used the object
test to determine the constitutionality of laws in Commerce-Clause cases, so
today's Court should use the same test to determine the constitutionality of
laws in Second Amendment cases.
2. The Infantryman Test
While the object test addresses the right to self-defense, which is the core
of the Second Amendment, stopping the analysis there would neglect the
Second Amendment's second purpose: to protect the right of the people to
form a well-regulated militia. This does not mean that the people would be
entitled to possess every weapon that could be useful in military service. The
Second Amendment protects the right of the people "to keep and bear
arms."'" When the Second Amendment was framed, the word "bear"
meant "carry.""' Thus, "the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in
existence at the time of the founding."'46 In other words, the Second
Amendment protects arms that a person could carry. To the extent that a
test is helpful, a court should ask whether the weapon that the government
is seeking to ban is one that an infantryman could carry for combat. If the
answer is yes, then the possession of such a weapon is prima facie protected
under the Second Amendment. 4 1
In sum, under the object test, gun control laws that abrogate the right to
self-defense are illegal under the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God and
under the Second Amendment, but laws that protect the public safety are
legitimate exercises of a government's police powers. However, even if the
gun control law passes the object test, the final question is whether the gun
control law deprives a person of possession of a weapon that an
144. U.S. CONST. amend. II (emphasis added).
145. Heller, 554 U.S. at 584.
146. Id. at 2791-92. As discussed above, Justice Scalia recognized an exception for
military-grade weapons. For the reasons discussed above, this exception was error; thus the
above-quoted rule is the correct rule.
147. See infra Part III.A.
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infantryman could carry. If yes, then the government may not ban
possession of that weapon.
III. APPLICATION TO MODERN ISSUES
A. The Keeping ofArms
The following subsection deals with the ownership of types of guns, i.e.
what kinds of guns people should be allowed to keep. The issue of bearing
arms will be addressed infra.
1. Handguns
Both Heller and McDonald struck down laws that banned, or effectively
banned, handguns." Furthermore, Heller struck down a law that required
handguns in the home to be either disassembled or locked. After these two
cases, it is unlikely that a state will be able to ban the ownership of
handguns for the average person. 149
Interestingly, Jesus, the Author of the Laws of Nature and of Nature's
God,"so commanded his disciples to buy swords."' Dr. Wayne Grudem says
that it was common for people to carry swords in Jesus' day for self-defense
instead of relying completely on the protection of the Roman officials.'52
Because self-defense is a God-given right,'5 3 and because the Author of the
law of nature was commanding His followers to acquire the weapon that
was most commonly used for self-defense, it appears that the Laws of
Nature and of Nature's God forbid governments from banning the most
standard weapon for self-defense in a society. In the case of the United
States, the Heller Court observed that this weapon is a handgun."' Thus,
even without Heller, McDonald, or even the Second Amendment itself, one
could argue that the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God forbid
government from preventing handgun ownership.
148. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010); Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
149. Issues relating to specific kinds of persons will be addressed infra, Part III.C.
150. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was
God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came into being through Him, and apart
from Him nothing came into being that has come into being." John 1:1-3.
151. Luke 22:35-38.
152. See GRUDEM, supra note 39, at 202-03.
153. See discussion supra Part II.A.
154. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,628-29 (2008).
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2. Shotguns
Neither McDonald nor Heller addressed the issue of shotgun ownership.
Like handguns, shotguns are more of a defensive weapon than offensive
weapon.' Shotguns, while probably more dangerous than handguns, are
short-range weapons. The shot is very effective at close-range, but its
effectiveness dissipates as distance increases. As a reult, a shotgun is
probably most effective for in-home defense situations and better suited for
self-defense than for assault. Because McDonald and Heller hold that the
Second Amendment protects the core right of self-defense," 6 and because
shotguns are highly effective for self-defense, a government may not ban
shotgun ownership.
3. Rifles
"Rifles" in this subsection refer to rifles that are not military-grade, such
as lever-action rifles,'57  bolt-action rifles, 58  and certain types of
semiautomatic rifles and carbines that are no longer conventional military
weapons.' Rifles like these are desirable because of their range and
accuracy.' 60 Because these weapons typically neither have a high magazine
capacity' 6' nor are capable of automatic fire,162 they are not likely to be the
weapon of choice to harm the public. However, because rifles are more
effective long-range weapons, they are not likely to be the weapons for in-
home defense either. 6 1 While they may be used for either, the most likely
use for rifles like these is hunting.'"
155. See DAVID STEIER, GUNs 101, at 69 (2011).
156. See discussion supra Part II.B.
157. See STEIER, supra note 155, at 51-55.
158. Id. at 55-57.
159. See id. at 57-58. While the "semiautomatic rifle development was spurred by
military needs," civilians also can enjoy "the ability to have fast follow-up shots for target
shooting/plinking, or hunting." Id. at 57.
160. Id. at 50 (stating that the grooves in the barrel make "the projectile fly more
accurately and further").
161. See, e.g., id. at 58 (stating that one such rifle, the Russian SKS, had a ten-round
magazine that is loaded from the top of the rifle).
162. See id. at 59-60 (contrasting "rifles" as discussed in this subsection with automatic
weapons, which are largely unavailable to the public).
163. See id. at 50.
164. Id. at 54 (discussing why hunters love lever guns), 55 (stating that many hunters
prefer bolt-action rifles), 57 (stating that civilians find the fast follow-up shots of
semiautomatics useful for hunting). Another common use for such a rifle is for sport,
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Under the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God, government may not
completely ban hunting. After the flood, God told Noah and his
descendants, from whom all of mankind has come, "Every moving thing
that is alive shall be food for you; I give all to you, as I gave the green
plant."' 5 As a result, man has a God-given right to eat animals. While there
are alternatives to meat, if meat is the only source of food available to a
person when he is starving, he must possess the means to attain the meat. In
other words, he must be permitted to hunt so that he does not starve. Thus,
under the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God, man has a right to hunt.
Because a rifle is best-suited for hunting, governments may completely ban
the ownership of rifles.
4. Assault Weapons
"Assault weapons" has been a common term referring to classes of
weapons in the last several decades, but unfortunately the term has lacked a
uniform definition.'66 Local laws have sometimes classified "assault rifles"
based on their technical design history, a classification that has been found
unconstitutionally vague because "it was considered unreasonable to
require persons of ordinary intelligence to trace the design history of a
weapon in order to determine its status under the ordinance."'6 Other laws
have defined assault weapons based on magazine capacity, military style, or
the weapon's capacity for automatic fire.'68 In order to avoid vagueness
problems, the latter definition is probably the most constitutionally sound
definition of "assault weapons." While the possibilities for analysis under
assault-rifle classification are endless, for the sake of brevity, this section will
discuss the ownership of military-style automatic and semiautomatic rifles
only.'69
specifically for target shooting. Id. at 54, 55, 57. However, for the sake of brevity, this
subsection will focus solely on hunting.
165. Genesis 9:3.
166. See Eric C. Morgan, Note, Assault Rifle Legislation: Unwise and Unconstitutional, 17
AM. J. CRIM. L. 143, 144-45 (1990); David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Validity, Construction,
and Application of State or Local Law Prohibiting Manufacture, Possession, or Transfer of
"Assault Weapon," 29 A.L.R. 5TH 664, §2[a] (1995).
167. Marchitelli, supra note 166, §2[a].
168. Morgan, supra note 166, at 145; see also Robertson v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 978
P.2d 156, 160 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that the city of Denver's ban on assault weapons
included fully automatic weapons).
169. See e.g., THE SHOOTER'S BIBLE 128-32, 142-46, 149, 160-65 (104th ed. 2012)
(describing various types of military-like rifles). The analysis of each species of weapon
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Automatic rifles are rifles that, "after firing a round of ammunition,
automatically reload and fire again, performing this sequence repeatedly as
long as their triggers are depressed and their ammunition supplies have not
been expended."o70 One such firearm is the M-16, which the United States
adopted as its standard military firearm in 1964.' Civilian forms of these
weapons exist as semiautomatics.17 The AR-15, for example, "is the civilian
version of the military's M- 16 rifle, and is, unless modified, a semiautomatic
weapon.""' These semiautomatic weapons cannot "spray fire" like
automatics, are not designed to be "fired from the hip" (as would be useful
in close-range combat), and are not capable of automatic fire without
modification. 74 Thus, semiautomatic assault weapons, regardless of the fact
that they may look like their military counterparts, are not nearly as optimal
for "assault" as their automatic counterparts. Consequently, "semiautomatic
assault weapon" is an oxymoron.
Applying the principles discussed above, the Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God recognize the right to self-defense, 7 1 which, as Heller
recognized, is the core of the Second Amendment.'7 6 However, the
government has the police power to protect the public safety. '7 While
assault weapons certainly may be used for self-defense, they are not the
most optimal weapons for self-defense. Automatic rifles have the capacity to
"spray fire," which increases the chance of collateral damage and hurting
innocent bystanders, which is certainly a valid public safety concern.17 1
Moreover, the capacity of assault rifles to hit targets from long distances
presents the reasonable possibility that these weapons would be used for
offensive instead of defensive purposes. Thus, under the object test alone, a
would be the subject of a treatise or a law review article devoted to assault weapons alone,
which for the sake of time is not possible here.
170. See Fully-Automatic Firearms, supra note 96.
171. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 609 F. Supp. 1174, 1175-76 (C.D. Ill.
1985).
172. See STEIER, supra note 155, at 59.
173. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 603 (1994).
174. Semi-Automatic Firearms and the "Assault Weapon" Issue Overview, NRA-ILA,
http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/fact-sheets/2013/assault-weapons-overview.aspx
(February 15, 2013).
175. See supra Part II.A.
176. See supra Part II.B.
177. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 344.
178. See Semi-Automatic Firearms and the "Assault Weapon" supra note 174 (noting the
ability of automatic weapons to "spray fire").
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court could reasonably conclude that assault weapons are not optimal for
self-defense, and therefore a government could ban them.
However, while the core of the Second Amendment is the right of self-
defense, the Second Amendment also protects the right of the people to
form an effective militia." 9 As stated above, the Founders recognized that
the militia was necessary to repel invasions, suppress insurrections, and
resist tyranny.'s0 The Heller Court itself said, "It may well be true today that
a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require
sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large." 8. Indeed,
James Madison's argument that a militia could effectively resist a standing
army apparently presupposes that both the army and the militia would be
armed with the same weapons. It is difficult to imagine how a modern
militia could fight a modern army without modern military-grade arms.
Thus, under the infantryman test, most weapons classified as "assault
weapons" could be carried by a militia man. Consequently, the Second
Amendment protects the right of the people to keep military-grade
automatic and semiautomatic rifles, commonly called assault weapons.
B. The Bearing ofArms
As discussed above, the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God recognize
the right of self- defense.'82 The need for self-defense does not disappear
when one leaves his home. On the contrary, a person is even more
vulnerable to attack in public than he is in his own home. In a home, a
person has the benefit of walls and locked doors, but enjoys no such
protection in public. Because the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God
protect the right to self-defense, and because the need for self-defense still
exists in public, then the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God demand that a
person must have the right to defend himself in public. Consequently, a
person must have the means to be able to defend himself in public.
Therefore, as a general rule, the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God require
that a person must have the right to bear arms, not only the right to keep
them.
If any doubt remains from the nature of the argument, specific cases of
this law in action are found in Scripture. When Christ told His disciples to
179. See supra Part II.B.
180. Id.
181. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008).
182. See discussion supra Part II.A.
2014] 743
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
buy swords, He did not tell them to leave them at home but apparently
told them to have swords for self-defense even on their travels. 83
Moreover, Nehemiah made the people bear arms while they worked on
the wall because of an imminent threat of their enemies.184 In that case,
people were not only permitted but required to carry arms in public. Even
when Jesus told Peter to put his sword back in its place, He never told
Peter to stop carrying his sword, but rather forbade him from using it in
that particular case.' Thus, cases from Scripture confirm that a right to
bear arms exists. 86
Moreover, the constitutional analysis yields the same result. In Heller,
after an extensive historical analysis, the Court concluded that the Second
Amendment protected "the individual right to possess and carry weapons
in case of confrontation."' Thus, under the analyses of the Laws of Nature
and of Nature's God and Heller, the right to carry arms for purposes of self-
defense may not be infringed. While it may be permissible to regulate the
manner of bearing arms for the sake of the public safety, a concern that will
be addressed infra, any such regulation may not destroy the right to carry
arms for self-defense.
In the United States, the gun that is best-suited for carrying is a handgun.
Handguns are easy to carry because they are small. Moreover, handguns are
optimal for self-defense in close-range combat. Consequently, Americans
are more likely to carry handguns for self-defense than any other type of
gun. The first question, then, is whether a government may regulate the
manner of bearing handguns without infringing upon the Second
Amendment.
Many states have laws regulating whether a person may carry a weapon
openly or carry concealed.' Some states forbid open carrying but make
183. See GRUDEM, supra note 39, at 202-03 (analyzing Luke 22:35-38). See also
discussion supra Part II.A.2.
184. Nehemiah 4:7-13.
185. Matthew 26:51-54; see also GRUDEM, supra note 39, at 194-95; supra note 69
(analyzing Matthew 26:51-54).
186. It is important to remember, though, that this right to bear arms exists for the
purpose of self-defense, not for the purpose of waging war on society. See discussion supra
Part II.A.2. See also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *184 ("This right of natural
defence does not imply a right of attacking.").
187. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (emphasis added).
188. STEIER, supra note 155, at 113.
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concealed carrying fairly easy;'"9 others allow open carry but put
restrictions in place for concealed carrying.190 As discussed above,
however, a government may not infringe upon the right to carry for self-
defense."' Therefore, if a government forbids open carrying and requires
a citizen to receive the government's permission to carry concealed (or
vice versa), that law is illegal: both avenues for carrying have been closed,
and even if one can be easily opened (such as when a state has a shall-issue
concealed carry policy),'92 the citizen is still waiting for the government to
give him permission to exercise his God-given and constitutionally
protected right. Thus, a state may restrict only one of the two avenues of
carrying, and only if it has the proper justification for doing so.' The
question then becomes whether there is justification for banning either
form of carrying.
Concealed carrying raises a public safety concern that is not present with
open carrying. When a weapon is concealed, the person carrying the
concealed weapon is in a better position to ambush a target because the
target does not know that the assailant is armed. Consequently, a legitimate
public safety concern may exist with concealed weapons. This may explain
why Justice Scalia in Heller thought that the state may limit the carrying of
concealed weapons."' Therefore, it appears that there is a legitimate
justification for regulating the concealed carrying of weapons.
In contrast, the open-carrying of a handgun may frighten people, which
could arguably raise a public welfare concern. However, the traditional
remedy to prevent gun owners from terrifying the people was to prohibit
the carrying of "dangerous or unusual weapons."'95 Handguns are common
189. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02 (West 2012) (forbidding carrying weapons
under most circumstances); TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN §§ 411.171-.177 (West 2012) (stating that
the government shall issue a concealed carry license if certain conditions are met).
190. See. e.g., Virginia, NRA-ILA, http://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/state-laws/virginia.aspx
(last updated July 12, 2013) (discussing Virginia's laws permitting open carrying and regulating
concealed carrying).
191. See supra Part IIA-B (discussing the right of self-defense).
192. A "shall issue" law is a law "requiring that carry permits be issued to applicants who
meet uniform standards established by the legislature." Right-to-Carry 2012, NRA-ILA,
http://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/articles/2012/right-to-carry-2012.aspx (Feb. 18, 2012).
193. See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the scope of governmental authority and
the right of self-defense).
194. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
195. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148.
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weapons that are optimal for self-defense;1 16 they do not fall under the
classification of "dangerous or unusual weapons." There is no proper
justification for prohibiting the open carrying of handguns; therefore a state
may not prohibit open carrying of a handgun. Consequently, while a
government may limit the concealed carrying of handguns, it may not
prohibit the open carrying of handguns.
Having examined the issue of carrying handguns, the next question is
whether a government could regulate or ban the bearing of other kinds of
arms. Blackstone wrote "The offence of riding or going armed, with
dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by
terrifying the good people of the land[.]"' 97 In contrast to handguns, which
are common self-defense weapons, the regulation of carrying "dangerous or
unusual weapons" is rooted in concerns for the public safety and the public
welfare, which are within the realm of the police powers.' Under the object
test, "dangerous or unusual weapons" are more optimal for assault than for
self-defense.'" The scope of "dangerous or unusual" weapons would
probably include assault weapons as discussed in Part III.A.4, supra. Thus,
while a government may not ban the ownership of assault weapons, under
the object test, it may regulate, or perhaps even ban, the carrying of such
weapons in public. The final inquiry is whether the infantryman test would
yield a different analysis.200 While an infantryman would need to bear an
assault weapon when acting as a militiaman, such as when repelling an
invasion, suppressing an insurrection, or resisting a tyrannical army, none
of those situations apply to the daily life of a civilian under ordinary
circumstances.20' Consequently, a citizen could not rely on the Second
Amendment's prefatory clause in attempting to carry an assault weapon if
the militia was not needed. Thus, while a state may not prevent the
ownership of assault weapons, it may prevent the carrying of assault
weapons, and perhaps even the entire category of long guns.202
196. See supra Part III.A.1.
197. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *148.
198. See supra Part II.C.
199. See id.
200. See supra Part II.C.
201. See supra Part II.B-C.
202. "Long guns include both rifles and shotguns and are defined as any weapon that is
designed to be fired by bracing the weapon against the shoulder." STEIER, supra note 155, at
49.
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C. Miscellaneous Applications
This paper assumes that issues relating to the (1) keeping and (2) bearing
of arms are the most important questions that need to be addressed, and
therefore they were explored thoroughly in Part III.A-B, supra. Part III.C-E
discusses miscellaneous issues, such as laws regulating places, times, and
people. For the sake of brevity, these issues will not be addressed as
thoroughly as the previous issues.
1. Government Buildings
Every person has the right to self-defense. 203 However, sometimes the
person" with the right to self-defense is the government itself. Just as a
private property owner has the property right to exclude someone who is
not welcome on his property, so the government has the right to exclude
someone that is not welcome on its property so long as the property is a
nonpublic forum. Thus, if a government for reasons of self-defense requires
citizens entering government buildings to disarm themselves, the citizens
must comply. 20
2. Sensitive Places
Sometimes the concern for the public safety is very high in "sensitive
places," 205 such as airplanes (where one shot breaching the plane kills
everyone) or schools (where children are unarmed and incompetent to
wield weapons).206 In such cases, the government has a right to restrict
firearm access to sensitive places because of the unusual threat to the public
safety.207 However, as Dr. Grudem observes, "[W]e must remember that ...
these situations are highly controlled areas with very low possibility of a
violent attack by one person against another, and in the extremely rare
occasions where an attack occurs, it is immediately subdued by the
authorities present."208 Unfortunately this is not always true, especially in
cases of schools for minors, but Dr. Grudem's analysis is a brilliant policy
suggestion. In so-called "sensitive areas," if the citizens are disarmed, the
203. See supra Part II.A-B.
204. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,626 (2008).
205. See id.
206. See id. "Schools" here undoubtedly refers to schools for minors. The author is in
favor of allowing the carrying of arms on campuses, or at a minimum, allowing the staff and
faculty to carry and having heightened security.
207. See id.
208. GRUDEM, supra note 39, at 211.
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government should take extra steps to ensure that authorities are present to
subdue an aggressor.
3. Places of Worship
The need for self-defense does not disappear when one steps into a place
of worship;209 consequently, the right of self-defense does not disappear
when one steps into a place of worship.210 Moreover, the Second
Amendment protects the right to carry arms and does not make an
exception for houses of worship.21' Consequently, laws forbidding carrying
firearms into places of worship are illegal because they abrogate the right of
self-defense. If houses of worship do not wish to allow firearms into their
gatherings, they may exclude people who will not honor their firearms
policy. But perhaps in church, the best way to protect the flock from the
wolves is to arm the sheep.212
4. Background Checks
There is a public safety concern when people with violent histories get
guns. Therefore governments may require reasonable background checks
before a person buys a gun.2 13
5. Time Restrictions
There is also a public safety concern if someone in the heat of the
moment seeks to buy a firearm. A required, short "cool-off' period is
permissible to address this concern.2 14 Nevertheless, it should not be used to
209. See Carl Chinn, Ministry Violence Statistics, CARLCHINN.COM, http://www.carlchinn.
com/Church_SecurityConcepts.html (last visited August 17, 2013) (discussing "deadly force
incidents" at faith-based organizations in the United States). "The pioneer in church security
statistics is Carl Chinn. He has been tracking violent crime in churches since 1999." Chuck
Chadwick, Church Crime Statistics, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF CHURCH SECURITY AND SAFETY
MANAGEMENT, http://www.nacssm.org/CrimeStats.htm (last visited August 17, 2013).
210. See supra Part II.A.
211. See U.S. CONsT. amend. II.
212. In the Colonial Era, both Virginia and Georgia required their inhabitants to take
their guns to church with them. BARTON, supra note 97, at 30, 32. While these laws went too
far in requiring people to carry arms instead of simply protecting their right to carry arms,
these early laws show that the idea of carrying guns to church is not unprecedented.
213. See supra Part II.A, C (discussing the government's authority to legislate for the
public safety).
214. Cf Plato, Republic, in CLASSICS OF POLITICAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 34-35 (Steven
M. Cahn ed., 2002) (arguing that it would be unjust for a man to give a dangerous weapon
back to his friend when his friend is in a "fit of madness"). The author cites Plato's Republic
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delay the purchase of a firearm if the person is seeking it in self-defense and
clearly is not in a state of anger. Failure to make this distinction may result
in an arbitrary loss of liberty at best and the loss of life at worst.
6. Mentally Ill
The mentally ill, like children, lack the competence needed to properly
operate a firearm. That raises a public safety concern that a government
may address through restrictions on the mentally ill possessing firearms.215
7. Felons
The legitimacy of the argument that felons forfeit their right to keep and
bear arms ultimately turns on whether the felony involved violence. If it did,
then allowing a violent person to have a firearm raises a public safety
concern that the government may address. If the felony did not involve
violence, though, the state is requiring a person to surrender their
unalienable right to self-defense when they never abused that right. That is
unjust, and therefore states may not ban firearms for felony convictions that
had nothing to do with violence.216
IV. CONCLUSION
As the courts address new issues arising under the Second Amendment
after Heller and McDonald, they must construct the Second Amendment
not according to their own ideas of what gun laws should be, but rather
according to the text of the Amendment itself and according to the God-
given right that the Amendment was intended to secure. That is the essence
only for the limited purpose of supporting this proposition, not for endorsing the Republic;
for while Plato was correct in this one instance, he used this one exception to deconstruct the
God-given definition of justice and redefine justice his own way. The result of Plato's fallacy
was a state ruled by philosopher-kings. EIDSMOE, supra note 24, at 71. As John Adams wrote
to Thomas Jefferson after reading Plato's works, "My disappointment was very great, my
astonishment was greater, my disgust shocking ... His Laws, and his Republic, from which I
expected most, disappointed me most." Id. at 72 (omissions in the original).
215. See Plato, supra note 214, at 34-35 (arguing that it is unjust to entrust someone in a
"fit of madness" with a dangerous weapon).
216. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *12 ("As to the measure of human
punishments ... it must be left to the arbitration of the legislature to inflict such penalties as
are warranted by the laws of nature and society, and such as appear to be the best calculated
to answer the end of precaution against future offenses."). Consequently, if the punishment
of depriving the felon of the right to keep and bear arms has nothing to do with deterring the
felon from committing similar felonies in the future, then such a punishment is unjust.
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of a true Second Amendment jurisprudence. The government may enact
gun-control regulations that are made only pursuant to that government's
just powers (which in a state government would be its police powers, but in
a federal government would be its enumerated powers), but only if such
regulations would not infringe upon the right of self-defense or deprive a
citizen of the possession of a weapon that an infantryman could carry.
Hopefully the courts will acknowledge these principles and apply them as
they confront new issues, so that they will interpret the Second Amendment
faithfully and protect the rights of the people that God has given and the
Constitution has secured.
